This talk presents a novel interpretation of Émilie Du Châtelet’s neglected understanding of time. It argues, first, that her account presupposes a foundational notion of successive being, analogous to Descartes’s foundational notion of extended being. Second, it suggests that Du Châtelet holds that time is the order of successive being insofar as successive beings succeed one another, and clarifies her view by contrasting it with Leibniz’s more familiar relational account. Third, it examines her subtle response to the absolute conception of time associated with Clarke and Newton, arguing that although she grants that the idea of absolute time is natural and even useful, she ultimately regards it as both false and dangerous. Fourth, it contends that Du Châtelet rejects two long-standing assumptions about time inherited from Aristotle, namely that time is essentially tied to motion and to measure. Altogether, the talk hopes to show that Du Châtelet offers an intriguing, coherent, and even philosophically attractive conception of time.
